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BOOK REVIEWS
Selected Studies In Federal Taxation. Second Series. By Randolph
E. Paul, Philip Zimet and Muriel S. Paul. Chicago: Callaghan and
Co. 1938. Pp. xiii, 447. $5.00.
From beginning, to end, the authors bring not merely legal learning but enlightened and critical thinking to bear on a series of problems
illustrative of the growing confusion in certain fields of federal tax
law. They jump the first hurdles toward a tentative classification and
organization of certain branches of tax law, and their study has resulted
in that rare combination of an absorbing text with painstaking documentation. From the roots of exhaustive annotation spring a succession
of pointed comments which serve as experimental compass-marks for
the courts as well as for Congress.
Seven representative problems are selected for comprehensive treatment. In the first essay, The Effect on Federal Taxation of Local Rules
of Property, Paul takes inventory of the decisions in this field. He
notes that occasionally, as in the case of statutory mergers, the
federal revenue acts clearly contemplate that local law shall govern.
Occasionally, as with the meaning of the term dividend, the acts themselves dearly control. For the most part, however, it is left to the
courts to determine as best they can whether Congress intended that the
application of the federal act should be uniform or should vary according to local law. The resulting inconsistencies and inequalities lead
Paul to the conviction that federal tax law should be applied uniformly.
The difficulty lies in the special complexity of federal tax law which can
never be developed coherently unless it is disentangled from local law
and developed independently. The author's detailed analysis lends
force to the argument for concentrating tax litigation in special courts.
He suggests that the establishment of a single appellate court for tax
cases would go far to eliminate the uncertainties of the present system.
Such a proposal is bound to encounter the opposition which always
attends any proposed disturbance of things as they are, the weight of
tradition which serves to support a system not because it functions
effectively but because it somehow survives.
In the chapter on Federal Tax Compromises and Prospective Regulations, Paul makes a forceful criticism of an Attorney General's
opinion limiting the compromise power of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue and Secretary of the Treasury to those cases where
the claim is uncertain or collection doubtful. The same chapter argues,
persuasively for the constitutionality of the power granted the Coin-
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missioner to determine the extent to which regulations shall be applied
retroactively.
Another cause of inequalities is analyzed in the chapter on Res
Judicata in Federal Taxation. The authors recognize that the doctrine
is necessary to protect the courts from incessant litigation but are critical of its mechanical application in tax cases. They propose that Congress provide that the courts relax the rule in cases involving new
facts or interpretations.
One of the most interesting chapters in the book takes up the complex problem of Ascertainment of Earnings or Profits for the Purpose
of Determining Taxability of Corporate Distributions. It covers two
broad subjects: distributions out of unrealized gains and distributions
out of realized but unrecognized gains. Paul holds that in the first
case the distributions should not be treated as taxable dividends.
As for the latter, he takes issue with the rule of the Board of Tax
Appeals and of the lower federal courts that realized but unrecognized
gains constitute earnings or profits and that the distributions therefrom
accordingly constitute taxable dividends. His own view is that as such
gains are not recognized at the outset when they do not exist except
in a technical legal sense, they should not subsequently be recognized
for other purposes in the absence of a clear legislative intent to the
-contrary. He believes that the courts have erred in reading into the
act what Congress could constitutionally do rather than what it intended.
The chapter on Step Transactions, involving for the most part
reorganizations and other non-taxable transfers, takes account of the
confusion in the law on this subject. The problem as to whether a
number of steps constitute one transaction or a series of separate transactions is complicated by the indiscriminate use of a number of different doctrines. Nevertheless, with regard to the rule most generally
applied, the so-called interdependent test taken from the law of
contracts, Paul is inclined to let well enough alone on the ground
that the vagueness of such a test is amply compensated by its adaptability to a variety of situations.
' A major source of confusion is analyzed in the chapter on Motive and
Intent in Federal Tax Law. This elusive subject is tackled in all its
ramifications, from discussion of legislative intent and the distinction
between intent and motive, to consideration of such intensely practical
problems as accumulations of corporate earnings to avoid surtaxes upon
shareholders, gifts in contemplation of death, and criminal liability.
Complicated as are the problems which the authors have done
much to elucidate, it is encouraging to note that the one forming the
basis of the last chapter, Thel Federal Tax Status of Will Contestants,
has been settled by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Lyeth v.
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Hoeyl holding that the amount received by an heir in compromise of a
will contest constituted an inheritance exempt from the income tax.
ROGER JOHN TRAYNOR.
School of Jurisprudence,
University of California,
Berkeley, California.
Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court. By Felix Frankfurter.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1938. Pp. 139. $1.50.
Three lectures, less than one hundred pages, make up this little
book. In terse and vital sentences, but with a restraint in full accord
with the nature and point of view of his subject, the writer has drawn
an entrancing, an enduring picture of a great American common law
judge and jurist.
He has drawn a picture of a judge greatly conscious of his function
to do justice according to law, greatly master of judicial method, the
method by which that justice is done. The author's artistry has made
us see, more clearly perhaps than most of us have ever seen, that
"There is no guaranty of justice, except the personality of the judge" ;1
that "It is the simple truth that the greatest task that has been given a
man, to discover justice, requires a standard of mental and moral
greatness far above the common average" ;2 that "Whenever it is the
business of the judge to discover what the law is in fields in which it
has not yet been formulated, his function has an appearance analogous
to that of the legislator himself" ;3 that "above all things, every jurist
must become as clear as possible in his own mind on the problem of
what constitutes his peculiar function in the life of society" ;4 that
"The play of the obscure forces of nature is powerless in itself to create
true juridical customs; the incessant collaboration of man is needed" ;5
and,that Holdsworth was entirely right when he said:
"Philosophical speculation 'about law and politics is an attractive
pursuit. A small knowledge of the rules of law, a sympathy with hardships which have been observed, and a little ingenuity, are sufficient to
make a very pretty theory. It is a harder task to become a master of
Anglo-American law by using the history of that law to discover the
principles which underlie its rules, and to elucidate the manner in which
'59 Sup. Ct. 155, 83 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 176 (1938).
"EHRLICH, Judicial Freedom of Decision, Its Principles and Objects in
ScIENcE OF LEGAL METHOD (1917) 65, 66, 70, 73, 75, 77.
Ibid.
GkNY, Judicial Freedom of Decision, Its Necessity and Method. in SCIExca
OF LEGAL METHOD (1917) 2, 4, 5, 11, 18.

4 Ibid.

'LAMBERT,

281.

Codified Law

and Case Law in SciENcE OF

LEGAL METHOD (1917)

320

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

these principles have been developed and adapted to meet the infinite
complexities of life in different ages. Such students of our law will
learn, even though at second hand, something of the practical wisdom
which comes from knowledge of affairs. They will, for that reason,
be able to suggest solutions of present problems which will depend not
merely on their own unaided genius, but on the accumulated wisdom
of the past."
In the author's portrayal of Mr. Justice Holmes we see that while
common law judging, the making of common or case law in general,
is a special business, 7 common law judging in America, particularly the
making of the common law of the Constitution, is a very special business indeed. Made under the comon law traditions of constitutional
rights, and of stare decisis as modified, interpreted and applied under
written constitutions in the midst of change, the making of this constitutional case law requires character, intelligence, training, and courage
of the highest order.
Better, perhaps, than any other Mr. Justice Holmes has shown us
the true place in society, in short the true function, of the American
common law judge. Seeing more clearly than most, he has made more
clear than any other the difference in the judicial function and method
when the decisions of the judge have to do, on the one band, with
general common law, and on the other, with the common law of the
Constitution. In his writings and in his opinions he has made it clear
that in deciding ordinary common law cases judges must, and do, in a
manner legislate. He said it in 1881, in The Common Law.8 In
subsequent opinions he repeated 9 it.10 Again, in declaring that federal
courts were bound as to the law of a state as much by the decisions of
its courts"' as by the acts of its legislature,' 2 he affirmed that a state,
6
HOLDSWORTH, SOME LESSONS FROM OUR LEGAL HISTORY (1928) 24.
"Easier a great deal it is for men -by law to be taught what they ought
to do than instructed how to judge as they should do of law; the one being
a thing whith belongeth generally unto all, the other such as none but, the

wiser and more judicious sort can perform. Yea, the wisest are always touch-

ing this point the readiest to acknowledge that soundly to judge of a law is
the weightiest thing which any man can take upon himself." 1 'HoOKER, Ec-

90, see HUTCHESON, JUDGMENT INTUITIVE (1938)
35: "In form its [the law's] growth is logical. . . . in substance the,
growth of the law is legislative.... It is legislative in its grounds. The very
cLESIAsTIcAl POLITY (1604)

166.

8 P.

considerations which judges most rarely mention, and always with an apology,
are the secret roots from which the law draws all the juices of life. I mean,
of course, considerations of what is expedient for the community concerned."
"I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they
can do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions." Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 221, 37 Sup. Ct. 524,
531, ,61 L. ed. 1086, 1100 (1917) (dissenting opinion).

"Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U. S. 349, 372, 30 Sup. Ct. 140, 148, 54

L. ed. 228, 239 (1910) (dissenting opinion).
"Black and White Taxicab and Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab
and Transfer Co., 276 U. S. 518, 534, 48 Sup. Ct. 404, 409, 72 L. ed. 681,
688 (1928)

(dissenting opinion).

"Cf. Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. ed. 1188 (1938).
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in establishing its laws, speaks with two voices: one, its legislature;
the other, its courts. But though he has made it crystal clear that
when a state uses its judicial voice to declare the common law, judges
must and do legislate, that is, must and do consider and declare what
the public policy of the state should be and is, he has made it even
clearer that when the state uses its legislative voice, judges, in interpreting and applying the law thus declared, may not at all concern themselves with the policy or the wisdom of the statute.
In such cases judges have no function, except (1) to ascertain the
meaning of the law, and (2) to give that meaning effect, unless and
only unless the law appears unconstitutional beyond all reasonable doubt.
Particularly he has made it clear that in determining whether an act
is unconstitutional, the judge must turn rigidly away from considerations of "what is expedient for the community concerned", the very considerations which should properly concern him when the matter before
him is for decision as a matter of ordinary, rather than of constitutional,
common law.
The volume under review treats of the Justice's decisions on constitutional questions in three divisions. The first chapter treats of rights
in property, or the conflicting claims of the individual and society; the
second of civil rights, or the conflicting claims of liberty and authority;
the third of the federal system, or the conflicting claims of state and
nation. I have a little difference with the distinguished author, but
not much, in his drawing an apparent distinction between the matter
and manner of Mr. Justice Holmes' work in the three constitutional
fields he has selected for treatment here. His constitutional decisions
seem to me to be alike the work of a master craftsman. Characterized
throughout by the same profound conception of function, the same complete mastery of method, they conform throughout to the same clear
pattern.
I see, shining from each of his decisions in each of the fields, the
same spirit of the great master of the common law. Exhibited equally
in them all is the great common law learning, the great judicial restraint,
the great knowledge of function and method which he so magnificently
drew upon. All of them show the same cool, calm, discriminating exercise of the judicial process in finding the line beyond which it became the
duty of the Court to say to the legislature of the state or of the nation,
"Thus far thou canst go, and no farther." I see equally in them all the
same influence of his profound knowledge that the line could not be
finely, it must be broadly, drawn, and that it could never be drawn by
the Court except at the point where reasonable minds could not differ;
it could never be drawn except at the point where, beyond any reasonable doubt, the challenged act was beyond legislative power.
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I see, in short, in all of his opinions the same strong, steady, vigorous
working of a cultivated mind, the same dispassionate consideration, the
same superb judicial results, as without variableness, neither shadow
of turning, he went serenely on his appointed way, greatly conscious
of his function as a common law judge, greatly master of judicial
method. Had he done only this, his place on the earth would have
been a great one. But when there is added the fact that the matter
of his judging was expressed in matchless prose, it is seen at once that
his permanent place is not among men, it is with the immortals. In
the author's deathless phrase, "Mr. Justice Holmes has written himself
into the slender volume of the literature of all time."
JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR.
Houston, Texas.
Labour Relations in Republican Germany. By Nathan Reich.
'York: Oxford University Press. 1938. Pp. 293. $3.00.

New

Labour Courts. International Labour Office Studies and Reports, Series
A (Industrial Relations) No. 40. Geneva: International Labour
Office. 1938. Pp. v, 220. $1.25.
The transition in employer-employee relations since the World War
reflects the fundamental political, economic and social changes which
have occurred. To students, who have seen during this period the elimination of the private employer in Soviet Russia and the developing
control of the state over labour under Fascism, the efforts from 19191933 in Germany to fit a "collective organization of industrial relations within the frame-work of a traditional political democracy" should
be studied with particular concern.
Theoretical currents and institutional developments in Germany
had paved the way before 1914 for a considerable degree of state action
in the sphere of labour relations. By 1919, in accordance with the Weimar Constitution, labour was placed under the protection of the Federal
Republic and details of a uniform labour law were to be worked out
within the broad constitutional principles; freedom of association with
the aim of improving social and economic conditions was guaranteed;
a comprehensive system of social insurance was envisaged; and the
right to work or maintenance was stipulated. Art. 165, which was
looked upon by many as the cornerstone of a new social and economic
order, provided that "wage-earners and salaried employees are entitled to co6perate on equal terms with the employers in the regulation
of wages and working conditions, as well as in the entire economic
development of the productive forces."
Within his book Dr. Reich's objective did not call for a general
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consideration of labour relations or for a complete summary of the labour law during the period of the Republic. He was rather concerned
with singling out "the collective elements in the Weimar experiment
which were unique in their character and pioneering in their novelty."
The extensiveness of the system of collective bargaining was evidenced
by a network of national, district, local and company contracts which
covered over 12,000,000 wage-earners and sal;aried employees in 1929
(pp. 108-109). A rather complex system of mediation and arbitration furnished additional means for employee participation in the solution of questions involving his real income. The works councils, for
which a constitutional basis was provided in Art. 165, were instituted
by an Act of February 4, 1920. Designed to protect the common economic interests of wage-earning and salaried employees by whom the
members of the councils were elected, these agencies were set up in
establishments which employed at least twenty persons. As a device
for looking after the interests of workers and employers the works
councils proved effective instruments in supervising the enforcement
of collective contracts, in preventing violations of factory laws and in
maintaining discipline. For various reasons they did not provide successful means for the participation of labour in the management of establishments. The adjudication of labour disputes was entrusted to labour
courts, set up in accordance with the provisions of an Act of December 13, 1926. In these special tribunals an informal and inexpensive
procedure, along with representation of the trade unions and employers'
associations, was provided. Thus, on the basis of the right of association, there was built a system of labour law which placed an emphasis on collective bargaining, mediation and arbitration, and employee representation in establishment and judicial tribunal. These
developments represented the fruition of that part of the Weimar program which "was directed to the democratization of industrial relations through the sanction and active promotion of the collective organization of industrial relations" (p. 268) and which attempted "to
reconcile a system of private enterprise based on politico-legal individualism with the requirements for collectfie action in the field of
economic relations" (p. 269).
With the treatment of certain questions by Dr. Reich there is room
for difference of opinion. The absence of clear statutory guides made
of the Reich Labour Court an unwitting social engineer at times prior
to 1933, and the consequences of some of its bitterly criticized decisions was more serious to the "collective structure of industrial relations" than the author is willing to concede (p. 265). The discussion
of the National Economic Council (pp. 56-59), though in keeping with
the accepted appraisals of this body, would merit revision. An account
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of the changes in labour law administration between January, 1933, and
May 1, 1934 (when the National Labour Law of January 20, 1934, went
into effect), would have furnished additional justification for the concluding chapter on Transition to the Third Reich. But withal, Dr.
Reich in his well written and well documented book has made available
to American readers some of the best German materials; he has handled the difficult problem of translation with unusual skill; and above
all his general conclusions are sound.
International Labor Office's Labour Courts represents a companion study to its Conciliation and Arbitrationin Industrial Disputes (Series A, Industrial Relations, No. 34) which appeared. in 1933. This
Report is divided into two parts, the first containing a comparative
study of existing labour court systems and the second a series of individual monographs on each of the twenty-three states (including the
United States) which have special judicial agencies for the settlement
of labour disputes. Although the jurisdiction of the labour courts has
been confined largely to individual labour controversies and to "disputes
about rights or justiciable disputes", the courts have been entrusted
in many cases with the settlement of collective labour disputes and even
collective "disputes about interests" (pp. iii-iv, 19). No country which
has established a permanent labour judiciary alongside its regular judiciary has ever abandoned the experiment. On the contrary, "the
changes made were nearly always designed to extend the jurisdiction
of the special labour tribunals, and in certain countries they handle practically all cases of friction affecting employment relationships" (p. 54).
Of the institutions discussed by Dr. Reich, the labour courts alone have
been carried over with some structural changes into the Third Reich
(pp. 98ff.). The Report makes no effort to go further than to give
brief, formal and uncritical descriptions of the separate systems.
The statements that the members of the National Labor Relations Board
are appointed "subject to the approval of Congress" (p. 14) and that
an "amending Act of 1906 gave force of law to the decisions" of the
Interstate Commerce Commission (p. 201) are evidence of loose phraseology which can be explained by the scope of the Report but which
necessitates the reader's caution.
Those members of the legal fraternity who are interested in current aspects of labour relations in the United States would do well to
read the excellent volume by Dr. Reich. And friends and critics of the
National Labor Relations Act would find- some solace in various of
the monagraphs in Labour Courts.
TAYOR COLE
Department of Political Science,
Duke University,
Durham, N. C.

